The Economist said the following:
WITH luck rather than skill, Japan escaped the bubbles in housing, credit and commodities. As Western banks suffered, Japanese ones even went on a small acquisition spree. But the (fairly) good times are over. The unwinding of the yen carry trade, in which investors borrowed low-interest yen to place in higher-yielding assets abroad, has helped to send the yen soaring (see chart). Exotic foreign-currency products sold to retail investors reinforce the currency's upward trajectory.Personally I would say - and despite the venerable opinions of the Economist - that there was nothing either especially "lucky" or even "exotic" here - if you look carefully you will find that the similarities with what is happening in Germany are absolutely striking. Both countries have a very high populationmedian age (43), both have congenitally weak internal demand (no credit expansion driven housing booms here), both are thus completely dependent on exports (with GDP growth folding in rapidly as world trade growth comes to a halt), and both escaped the domestic lending driven banking problems being faced in the US, the UK or Spain, bygenerating an external lending driven ones - since they lent out in large quantities the precious fruits garnered from many hard years working to create very large current account surpluses. Now put that in your pipe, and go smoke it.
The stronger currency threatens the profits of Japan's big exporters, contributing to a stockmarket rout, which in turn is winnowing Japanese banks' capital. To alleviate the woe, the Bank of Japan was expected to cut interest rates from 0.50% to 0.25% on October 31st. But the economy will still get walloped.
The BOJ Drops Rates
The Bank of Japan cut its benchmark interest rate today to 0.3 percent - in a split decision with Governor Masaaki Shirakawa casting the deciding vote. The key overnight lending rate was thus lowered from 0.5 percent - the first rate reduction in seven years - after four of the eight board members voted "no", according to a statement from the central bank in Tokyo this morning (Friday).
Shirakawa had been under considerable pressure to lower borrowing costs after the Nikkei 225 Stock Average slumped to the lowest level since 1982, with widespread concern that the global financial crisis will only serve to deepen Japan's current recession (the economy declined at a 3% annual rate in Q2, and a further contraction in Q3 is more or less guaranteed. Until today, the bank had held rates steady even while other central banks across the globe cut, arguing that Japanese rates were already "very low". Now, with the US Federal Reserve Rate at only 1% (and Ben Bernanke rumoured to be making contingency plans for a Japan style ZIRP for the US) they do not seem to be that high.
Board members Miyako Suda, Atsushi Mizuno, Seiji Nakamura and Hidetoshi Kamezaki, all of whom have private sector backgrounds, voted against the decision. The central bank also cut back its growth forecast for the financial year ending March to 0.1 percent - from the 1.2 percent which was still being predicted as recently as July.
The bank also altered its inflation forcast, arguing that inflation will continue to fall next during the next fiscal year. The bank forecast assumes that core consumer prices will rise 1.6 percent in the current fiscal year and remain stationary in the following 12 months. This looks very optimistic to me, and I think we are soon headed back to deflation territory (see argument below) - prices month on month were already more or less stationary between August and September, and the so called core-core index has only been positive on an annual basis during the last 4 months out of the 32 since January 2006 (when my records stop).
The central bank also decided to begin paying interest on reserves commercial lenders hold at the bank to provide liquidity to the financial system and trimmed the Lombard rate - the cost it charges for loans made directly to member banks - to 0.5 percent from 0.75 percent.
Before today, Shirakawa and his board had given no indication they planned to cut borrowing costs, other than to say that policy was "flexible". Even following today's decision policy makers do not seem comfortable with the situation they find themselves in, and warned that `"from a longer-term perspective" keeping borrowing costs low for too long "may lead to larger swings in economic and financial activity as well as in prices". Well, as Keynes also warned in the longer term perspective the only thing we know for sure is that we are all dead, and in the meantime I suggest it will be many a long day before we see the risk of that excessive asset bubble the BoJ seem to live in such fear of. Downside risks, recession, deflation and sustainability of the government debt dynamics seem to be much more to the point at the moment.
Inflation Stationary, When Do We Officially Get To Declare Japan Back IN Deflation?
Consumer prices excluding fresh food climbed 2.3 percent from a year earlier, after rising 2.4 percent in August, the statistics bureau said today in Tokyo. But if we look at the core core index (which strips out both energy and fresh food) then we can see that it has been completely flatlining over the last twelve months, and with a very large capacity overhang now developing, this index will almost certainly get back into negative territory very soon.
Even the general index (which includes both food and energy) has now screeched to a halt (as energy prices plummet), and was stationary between August and September, as can be seen in the chart below). The index currently stands at 99.6 (on a 2005 base of 100) and only really need to fall about 0.2% (which is sure to happen over the next couple of months I think) for us to be safely tucked back once more under the beloved deflation safety blanket, an eventuality which seems not to preoccupy the BoJ in the least.
Household Spending In Decline
Household spending fell for a seventh month in September, with overall household spending falling 2.3 percent year on year in price-adjusted real terms. Compared with August (on a seasonally adjusted basis), spending was up 1.7 percent.

The average Japanese household spent 281,433 yen ($2,856) in September according to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Spending by wage earners' households fell 3.4 percent in September from the same month a year ago.
Both Unemployment and Employment Fall
Unemployment in Japan decreased slightly in September, according to government data also out today (Friday).The seasonally adjusted jobless rate hit 4.0 percent, down from 4.2 percent in August. Many economists are confused by this - since they had forecast the jobless rate to stay at 4.2 percent - but they seem to be forgetting (yet one more time) to factor in Japan's ageing population ingredient, which means that the 15 to 75 population is now in slow decline, and that as employment conditions worsen normally see a withdrawal of people from the labour market rather than into unemployment. So unemployment may well rise in the months to come, but not necessarily by that much.

September's jobs-to-applicants ratio was 0.84, so there were only 84 available jobs for every 100 applicants. This was the lowest figure was since August 2004, and down on the 0.86 level reported in August.The government also said the number of new job offers decreased 13.4 percent from a year earlier - in fact there was a 21.3 percent year on year decline in August.
The number of people in the workforce shrank by 200,000 from August, and this drop was obviously the key factor behind the decline in the jobless rate. The number of people employed was also down - by 110,000 - and this was the fourth drop in five months.

So Onwards And Downwards We Go
Finally Prime Minister Taro Aso decided yestreday to postpone the national election that polls suggest could have seen him and his ruling LDP party being pushed out of power. He also announced an "economic revival" package, worth an estimated $275 billion, of which $50 billion would come from new spending (and the quantity of new money needed would undoubtedly have been higher if the BoJ had not "conveniently" cut interest rates today. The details we have so far on the package suggest it is set to give large tax breaks to home mortgage holders, extend tax cuts for capital gains, lower highway tolls and give loans to small businesses.
However, even with the stimulus package, Aso acknowledged that "It will take three years for the Japanese economy to fully cure itself." "The most important thing is to allay concerns about people's livelihoods," since the world economy is being pounded by a "once in a 100 years storm". Of course, more than any of the other major economic powers, export-dependent countries like Japan and Germany are the once who are receiving most of the pounding from that storm...
And before we talk about Japan's economy being finally "cured", it may well be that we need to get through to a once and for all thorough diagnosis of the problem. So I will juts leave you with two more charts. The first of these is the one showing Japan's long term low fertility problem.

And the other is the one showing the steadily rising population median age which this produces.

Now, with Japan debt to GDP currently standing at 182% (according to OECD data), we might like to ask ourseleves just how many times Japan can spin round on this merry-go-round (remember we are now back effectively in 1998, but with a much higher debt to GDP) before the spinal axis finally snaps (or something worse happens). The latest package will only send debt to GDP even higher, and probably we will see more of the same in 2010. So is the sky really the limit here? Or will someone one day finally prove willing to take the bull by the horns, accept that what is happening actually is happening, and start to do something about it.
The Japanese government last week acknowledged Japan has probably entered its first recession in six years as exports, production and spending slow. And who am I to disagree with them. Now onwards and downwards we go to the coming Q3 GDP release.
Disclosure Statement: Edward Hugh is a macroeconomist who maintains a premier set of blogs at Global Economy Matters and is a featured analyst at Emerginvest. Edward Hugh provides non-partisan information about world stock markets, and does not have any holdings in foreign equities. The information stated above should not be construed as investment advice, and Edward Hugh is not liable for any actions taken on said materials.









13 comments:
This is where Japan's long term policy of subsidizing the export sector at the expense of domestic industries comes back to bite them. All of those trade surpluses went into the accounts of the zaibatsu and not into the paychecks of the workers. The populace carefully watches their savings so that they'll be able to survive.
Edward
As always an interesting post, though I think short term developments (the decline in the need to recycle trade and current account surpluses might have some surprising consequences) are going to influence Japanese policy decisions rather than the demographic profile.
Regarding the fiscal stimulus package, I concur that its only likely long term effect will be to add to government debt. When does the government debt become unsustainable? I don't know any better than you, but I suspect that the best clue would be to look for signs of Japanese investors exhibiting capital flight - not likely under the present circumstances.
A political perspective on Japan's problems is required, too. Political change is unlikely to alter things much, as the only major difference in policy between the LDP and DP is where best to spend public money: in rural constituencies, the LDP's stronghold; or urban constituencies, the DP's power base. Also, in announcing the current fiscal stimulus package, Mr. Aso was only reading from a prepared script. What is needed is leadership (like that delivered by Mr. Aso's gran'pappy) to create a political and public consensus on the country's future, then bang heads together to achieve it. We are searching the horizon, but.....
Zenibako
"As always an interesting post..."
Thanks
"though I think short term developments (the decline in the need to recycle trade and current account surpluses might have some surprising consequences) are going to influence Japanese policy decisions rather than the demographic profile."
Well yes, surely. The short term decisions will determine in the short term, but it is the longer term problem that means that the whole thing keeps going round in ever diminishing circles.
"I don't know any better than you, but I suspect that the best clue would be to look for signs of Japanese investors exhibiting capital flight - not likely under the present circumstances."
Well obviously I agree. But I think that this time round (in terms of business cycles) the issue of sovereign defaults might just make it up over the radar somewhere. Possibly in Greece, and maybe even Italy. I am not sure. If not this time then after the next cycle almost certainly, and once one default it will become a concern that people will find it hard to get away from. Just look at how the "contagion" has spread across the whole global banking system after a relatively small number of US "write downs".
"Political change is unlikely to alter things much, as the only major difference in policy between the LDP and DP is where best to spend public money: in rural constituencies, the LDP's stronghold; or urban constituencies, the DP's power base."
I quite agree, but as I am not really a political commentator I find it hard to go much further than expressing my total frustration, in Japan, and many other places facing problems that are not that dis-similar.
Edward
A few general remarks regarding your reply.
If my flaky memory serves me correctly, Japanese bureaucrats first started flagging the demographic time bomb in the 1980s. The 90s brought their own set of urgent economic problems, and I guess one of the difficulties for policy makers at present is, are they dealing with the aftermath of the bubble, or the onset of the demographic problem. Last week Mr. Aso, like his predecessor earlier in the year, let slip that the Consumption Tax would rise.... and then retracted his statement. Obviously, increases in the consumption tax are high on the bureaucratic agenda, and are awaiting a politically opportune moment for delivery. All the same, Japan is a wealthy country, so the whole process can keep on "going round" a few more times yet.
In other posts you gave your reasons for using the Gross Debt to GDP ratio. I can vaguely remember when the total of Public + Private Sector Debt was the preferred measure of economic stress. Would this measure alter the perspective significantly for Japan?
One of the problems I have with trend projections in general is that they are a bit like the irresistible force meets immovable object conundrum - it doesn't happen because something has to give to accommodate one or the other. One of the obvious benefits of deflation in the Japanese economy is that supporting the elderly is going to cost a lot less than current projections suggest.
I wasn't sure, but were you suggesting that Japan might default on its debt? It seems unlikely, and in any case, historically, the preferred course has been to debase the currency. The Bank of Japan might object, but as was the case during Hayami's tenure, the other branches of government can sit it out until a more pliable Governor comes along.
Zenibako
Edward - I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on the argument that net government debt to GDP is a better indicator of the indebtedness of Japan, versus gross debt. Under the former, the number is around 60%, the latter 180%. Japan doesn't run a unified budget accounting system; assets from one government account which are lent to another are recorded as debt on a gross basis, whereas the net increase is obviously zero..
Hello both of you. I'll deal with this argument from Chris first since I think it gets to the heart of the problem.
"Edward - I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on the argument that net government debt to GDP is a better indicator of the indebtedness of Japan, versus gross debt. Under the former, the number is around 60%, the latter 180%."
Basically I don't buy this argument, and in this I go along with the main international agencies who think about it - the IMF and the OECD.
Basically, though, before I start, it doesn't matter terribly where you place the goalposts, if the debt GDP is rising - as it is on both measures - and you can't reverse this process, then one day or another you simply go bust. Especially if your trend growth tends downwards (as it must) as the size of the workforce starts to shrink - as it will.
Basically Japan is now at the point where the labour force will start to decline. Up to now Japan has made heroic efforts to try to comensate for the ageing society component, by creating large numbers (in a way which is very similar to Germany) of very low productivity and low wage jobs. But at some point this will reach a peak, and the numbers employed will start to fall, and with this GDP. As GDP falls, unless you run budget surpluses, which is precisely what Japan is proving incapable of doing, then you can't reduce debt to GDP, and its as simple as that.
Now for the details. Basically, going by the IMF numbers published after the last Section IV consultation procedure (June 2008) gross debt has increased as follows:
2003 - 167.32%, 2004 - 178.1%, 2005 - 191.6%, 2006 - 194.7%, 2007 - 195.4%, 2008 - 197.9%.
As we can see these numbers (which are all % GDP) are higher than the OECD ones (more on this in a minute).
Now the net debt % published by the IMF are rather higher than those you you were suggesting.
2003 - 76.5%, 2004 - 82.7%, 2005 - 84.6%, 2006 - 88.4%, 2007 - 90.7%, 2008 - 93.8%. (2008 numbers in both cases are estimates).
Now right off something needs to be said. That at just the moment when the government were supposed to be trying to balance the books (ie stop increasing debt to GDP) we are going to see a large bank bailout, and an economic stimulaus package. Now my argument is simple, you need to think across the whole cycle here. So if you want resources to spend during the downturn, you need to acculumlate those resources during the upturn. It is just this that Japan (and Germany, and Italy) are proving incapable of doing, and this is what should be the worrying part for those who start to think about it.
Now, lets look at the OECD data.
2003 - 159.5%, 2004 - 167.1%, 2005 - 177.3%, 2006 - 179.7%, 2007 - 182%.
These are slightly different from the IMF data (and indeed the OECD data for European countries is quite different from the Eurostat data) which means that there are different accounting conventions applied. I am not an accountant, and I am certainly not a specialist in government finances, but I can see when numbers are rising and when they are falling, and I can see who has real difficulties in reducing debt and who doesn't. The OECD numbers are interesting, I suppose, since they facilitate international comparisons.
Now the large difference between the gross and the net debt in the Japanese case is due to the social security and pension funds. But these are resources against future obligations, so it is also a little illegitimate to say that the net debt is only 93.8% of GDP, since the assets you are counting on the plus side are earmarked for spending as we move forward. This is why it is so important to undersatnd what having an inverting pyramid means, since obviously if the population pyrmaid wasn't inverting these resources would be constantly replenished, but as it is they will need to be spent, and as they are spent then the size of the net debt will rise accordingly, so it is really quite illegitimate on my view to treat these resources as if they were completely unproblematic. Japan is in a sort of double bind on how to pay for the pensions and health care of the elderly population, and better to face up to this than try and avoid it.
As I say, it isn't so much the fact that the debt GDP ratio is at any given level "x" that matters as whether it is going up or down, and Japan is proving unable to get it to come down, in the same way that it is unable to get interest rates above 0.5% at ANY point in the business cycle, and these are important and worrying problems.
"If my flaky memory serves me correctly, Japanese bureaucrats first started flagging the demographic time bomb in the 1980s. The 90s brought their own set of urgent economic problems, and I guess one of the difficulties for policy makers at present is, are they dealing with the aftermath of the bubble, or the onset of the demographic problem."
Definitely. People have played with this demographic issue, and no one has taken the problem seriously, and now the chickens are coming home to roost, and there aren't enough tools in the tool box to deal with the problems all at once. But this is just it, it is hard to see where we go from here, really hard.
"One of the obvious benefits of deflation in the Japanese economy is that supporting the elderly is going to cost a lot less than current projections suggest."
A good and interesting point this one. I hadn't given it sufficient thought.
"Obviously, increases in the consumption tax are high on the bureaucratic agenda, and are awaiting a politically opportune moment for delivery."
Well, its strange how this "opportune" moment seems to keep taking so long to arrive. Actually, part of the issue must relate to differences between the MoF and the BoJ I would have thought, since at the MoF they are reluctant to raise consumption taxes, and thus keep wanting the BoJ to drop rates to make financing the deficit cheaper, while at the BoJ they want them to introduce a consumption tax so they can raise rates.
On the other hand I would be very careful with any consumption tax given the weakness of internal demand. Looking back at what happened in Japan in 1998, and what happened in Germany after the VAT hike in January 2007 I would be very careful.
"All the same, Japan is a wealthy country, so the whole process can keep on "going round" a few more times yet."
Obviously. I agree. I am just saying that there is a critical number in there somewhere. I am saying if things don't change course we will get there someday, I am not saying we have reached that point yet. But be very careful that market sentiment doesn't "turn" on over indebted ageing sovereigns at some point, since then things can move very rapidly indeed.
Here's an extract from the latest OECD Japan survey, just to give some idea of the tight corner which really does exist on health and pension costs.
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Controlling social security spending in the context of rapid population ageing is essential to limit the growth of government expenditures. Despite the reform of the public pension system in 2004 and some changes planned in healthcare, the government projects that gross public social spending – pensions, healthcare, long-term nursing care and welfare – will rise at a 3% annual rate over the next decade, boosting it by almost 1% of GDP to 18.4% by FY 2015. Pension reform was intended to limit pension spending to around 9¼ per cent of GDP over the next decade and ensure the sustainability of the system for 100 years, but the recent confusion about the accuracy of pension records creates doubts about pension administration. Moreover, the 2004 projections were based on strong assumptions. Despite the fact that some of these assumptions were revised downward in 2007, they are based on past trends and could prove to be fairly optimistic. Any slippage from the spending target should be resolved by a hike in the pension eligibility age, rather than by a further rise in the contribution rate, which is already set to increase from 13.6% in FY 2004 to 18.3% by FY 2017, and by measures to boost the return on the pension fund’s assets. As for public healthcare spending, the government aims to limit the rise from 5.4% of GDP in FY 2006 to 5.8% in FY 2015, a figure still below the current OECD average of 6%, despite population ageing. The increase in public healthcare spending is expected to be reduced by a number of reforms, including a reduction in medical fees and a new healthcare system in FY 2008 for those over age 75. However, the hike in the share of medical expenses to be paid by patients between 70 and 74 has been postponed for a year. In addition, healthcare spending is to be limited by preventing lifestyle-related diseases and reducing the length of hospital stays, although the impact of those reforms on healthcare spending remains uncertain. The key to achieving higher quality and greater efficiency in healthcare is accelerating regulatory reform, in part to allow a greater role for the private sector.
Hi, here is some more news from today which is relevant to this debate. People are increasingly taking out positions again Italian and Spanish sovereign debt. My guess is that Greece will be the first through the door, but Italy and then Spain may not be far behind. This has no direct relevance for Japan in the short term, since as Zenibako pointed out, the Japanese fund their own debt, and are thus not so exposed. But the global climate on advanced sovereigns is about to change, and Japan won't be able to hide forever from the undelying reality. Sooner or later it will be up over the radar, and by that point it will be too late. As it is already too late in Greece.
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Credit-default swap traders wagered the most on debt of Italy, Spain and Deutsche Bank AG, according to a Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. report that gives the broadest data yet on the unregulated market.
A total $33.6 trillion of transactions are outstanding on governments, companies and asset-backed securities worldwide, based on gross numbers, the DTCC said in the report released on its Web site yesterday. After canceling out overlapping trades, investors have taken out a net $22.7 billion of contracts based on Italy's debt, $16.7 billion against Spain and $12.5 billion on Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt, the report shows.
The DTCC, which operates a central registry of credit swaps trades, released the data for the first time as the industry steps up efforts to counter critics among U.S. lawmakers and regulators who blamed the lack of data for exacerbating the financial panic. The amounts outstanding are relatively small compared with some previous estimates and may calm some concerns that investors and dealers have too much at risk, said Brian Yelvington, a strategist at independent fixed-income research firm CreditSights Inc. in New York.
Edward
Some serious ammunition in support of my private + public debt argument. Follow the link:
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1828/
Zenibako
Hello Zenibako,
Thanks for the link, which is extremely useful. I live in Spain, and one of the points I am stressing here is how similar the Spanish and Japanese situations (Japan 1992, Spain 2007) are. I would certainly argue that the government in Madrid would do very well to fly in a team of Japanese advisers at this point.
But I'm not sure if there isn't some confusion here between us. I am certainly not arguing that you don't need to inject cash into the banking system to resolve the NPL problem. Far from it, I have been arguing in Spain that this is exactly what needs to be done, and it needs to be done in a way which restructures and downsizes the construction industry from the start. This is the big lesson of the Japanese experience (that and the need to apply ZIRP as early as possible)and the principle error was to wait till 1997/98 to do the injecting, and then to leave ZIRP way, way too soon.
We are on our way back to ZIRP now aren't we.
Actually, only part of the picture is presented by Koo, since you also need to think about private debt to GDP, which I guess has also been brought down during the "transition".
From Koo's chart, Japanese ddebt to GDP was "only" around 85% in 1992. Here in Spain it is currently 120% or so, and household debt (which must have been the same or higher in Japan in 1992) is at around 90%. So in Spain right now we have about 250% GDP in national debt (the government share is 60%, and obviosuly rising).
So we need to see this as a transition in TWO stages. The first stage the government assumes the debt burden that existed in the private sectors (household and corporate) - and as we see this massively boosts government debt to GDP. And then a second stage, where the government debt to GDP is brought down, and everything gets back to where it was before the bubble.
This second stage has yet to really get ubderway in Japan, and should have been starting now, but, lo and behold, along comes yet another crisis, and we are right back where we were in 1998 again, and this is when the alarm signals should start to go off in Japan.
These alarm signals should blow with double force since Japan simply cannot go back to where she was in 1992 - as a collective Japan now has a median population age of 43.8. In 1992 the age was 38.3, and by 2020 48.5. That is to say historical time doesn't simply turn constantly round on itself, there is a directional arrow, we get older, there is not eternal repetition of the same (this is the part neo classical economics hasn't cottoned on to yet) and there is no "hidden hand" (or homeostasis) to automatically restore things.
Japan Inc is moving in to uncharted waters (no one, literally no one, has ever been here before) and we have no charts and no compass.
Interestingly US median age was 36 in 2007 (no society with a median age of over 41 has to my knowledge ever had one of these dreaded bubbles, and I think there are good theoretical as well as empirical grounds for see why they won't. But the US isn't Japan - and this is where I think koo's analogy breaks down, since US median age is set to rise more slowly - to 38 in 2020 according to the US census bureau data base.
So countries like the US and France have discovered in part the secret of remaining "forever young" - by having near replacement fertility and judicious leveraging of immigration to plug the shortfall and maintain a more or less stable pyramid (t least for a longer period of time)
Interestingly (unless I missed something) Koo doesn't mention the dirty little word demography once, and this is just the problem. As you say Japanese bureaucrats first started flagging the demographic time bomb in the 1980s, we are now about to enter the 2010s and they are still flagging it, but no one has actually reached the point of doing anything about it, possibly because the economists don't think (at this point) that it is important. When the economists do finally get round to recognising that it is an issue - and the evidence is plentiful, just look at long term domestic consumption, export dependence, the difficulties shaking off deflation, declining trend GDP growth, etc) in all probability be too late. That, unfortunately, is Japan's tragedy.
Edward
The point I would like to draw on from Koo's work (as I understand it) is that private + public debt is the important figure, and my opinion is, that viewed from that angle Japan's debt to GDP ratio, and its trend are not as apocalyptic as headline writers would like it to be.
From memory again, the household sector in Japan has maintained a net surplus throughout the post-bubble period, though it has been declining of late. Ergo, for Japanese households in aggregate the post-bubble period has been about maintaining living standards rather than rebuilding the balance sheet. If only that would be true in the USA!
Returning to demographics, one of the broad objectives of Japanese economic policy is the maintenance of full employment. In that respect, some expenditures, particularly small business subsidies, have features of built in senescence: they are going to wither as employees (and employers) retire from the scene.
Yes, the global financial crisis has poleaxed any hope of a seamless transition from post-bubble economic therapy to demographic therapy in Japan. Uncharted waters indeed!
Zenibako
Hi again zenibako,
"The point I would like to draw on from Koo's work (as I understand it) is that private + public debt is the important figure"
OK, now I think I see clearly what the difference between the two perspectives is, since what I am saying is that there are two important numbers for understanding the sustainability of a society - total debt to GDP (and really, as you indicate, it doesn't matter that much how this is distributed across the three sectors - households, corporates and government - to some extent there is room here for cultural preferences, France may prefer greater public debt and the US greater household for example) AND population median age, and its probable evolution.
I mean as an individual I am quite happy to assume a far higher level of debt to current income (to buy a home for example) when I am between 35 and 40 than I am when I am between 55 and 60, and I don't see why this should be any different for a society, and this second number (and its future dynamics) would seem to be left completely out of the picture by Koo and many others who make this kind of analysis.
Obviously I agree that the first number is an important one.
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